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Abstract
Switzerland is one of the few countries with a relatively mature funded
pension scheme. This paper oﬀers a short description of the Swiss system,
highlighting two speciﬁc areas for which previous experience is particularly
valuable. Taking the Swiss example, ﬁrstly, it illustrates the importance
of prudential regulation and adequate transparency standards. Secondly,
the paper explores the impact of diﬀerent pay–out options in a mandatory
second pillar.
1 Introduction
Probably the most important role annuities will play in the decades to come
is within mandated fully funded pension schemes. Designing and regulating a
so–called second pillar pension system is an ambitious task and requires care-
ful evaluations of diﬀerent policy options. As of today, only limited long–term
experience on mandated fully funded pension plans is available. A notable and
much cited example is Switzerland. Total accumulated capital stock amounted
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1to approximately 120% of GDP (see Figure 1) in 2000. Already today occupa-
tional pensions make up for approximately 40% percent of publicly provided or
regulated transfer income during retirement. This percentage is anticipated to
be higher for current contributors.
Figure 1
During the last 20 years Switzerland’s ﬁrst pillar AHV/AVS has suﬀered a
substantial loss of reputation and public conﬁdence due to ongoing and antic-
ipated demographic changes and their impact on the ﬁnancial viability of the
plan. The second pillar, on the other hand, had been considered a safe and re-
liable provider of income in old age until very recently. Occupational pension
plans had also played an important role in a traditionally tight labor market,
with ﬁrms oﬀering better pension plans attracting and keeping the better work-
ers. Increases in life expectancy and the recent fall in stock market prices have
turned the model pupil into the problem child of Swiss politics.
In this ongoing crisis, it turned out that forward–looking strategies of reserves
management were rare at best. Few companies had accumulated enough reserves
to cover the losses associated with a decrease in the market return. But the crisis
is also a consequence of an inﬂexible regulation that is neither indexed to general
economic conditions nor to demographic changes. The episode shows that it is
inherently diﬃcult to plan and regulate a system involving contracts spanning
over several decades.
An area for which the Swiss second pillar provides valuable insights is the
design of pay–out options. Mandated pension schemes are implemented primarily
to prevent old–age poverty that may result from short–sighted planning or from
the absence of adequate market saving instruments. From an economic eﬃciency
point of view, this goal should be achieved without distorting optimal individual
decisions too much. By law, Swiss second pillar annuities are joint annuities
even for individuals without potential survivors. This may lead to a substantial
redistribution from single to, on average more aﬄuent, married beneﬁciaries. On
the other hand, pension providers can (and often do) oﬀer the option to withdraw
the entire accumulated retirement assets as a lump sum. The combination of the
two features is hardly optimal from both an equity and an eﬃciency perspective.
The case of Switzerland thus shows that the design of pay–out options during
the decumulation phase is of crucial importance in mandated annuity plans.
2This paper provides a short overview of the Swiss pension system with a par-
ticular emphasis on the second pillar in section 2. The importance of prudential
regulation and supervision is demonstrated in section 3 that describes the recent
crisis of the Swiss second pillar in more details. Some illustrative evidence for the
importance of pay–out options drawn from the Swiss case is provided in section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Swiss old age insurance system
Switzerland has been the ﬁrst OECD country that has mandated an occupational
pension scheme as the second pillar to complement a pay–as–you–go (PAYG) sys-
tem. The reliance on a multi–pillar approach has triggered considerable interest
in the Swiss system. This section provides a short overview of the system, with
an emphasis on the second pillar with its merits and problems.
2.1 The system in a nutshell
The core of Switzerland’s pension system, also summarized in Table 1, is com-
posed of three pillars, of which the ﬁrst and second are of approximately equal
importance. The ﬁrst pillar AHV/AVS1 is a predominantly PAYG system. It
was introduced after a very successful referendum in 1948. The second pillar
is a mandatory, employer–based, fully funded occupational pension scheme (as
described in more details below). The so–called BVG/LPP2 became mandatory
in 1985, but had been a very important source of retirement for many Swiss em-
ployees long before the ﬁrst pillar was set up. The ﬁrst and second pillars are
complemented by a voluntary third pillar of individual tax–favored saving for
retirement.
Table 1
In 2000, on average, approximately 40% (50%) of publicly mandated retire-
ment income were paid out by the second (ﬁrst) pillar. This understates the
importance of the occupational pension system, however, as contributing agents
1AHV = Alters– und Hinterbliebenen–Versicherung; AVS = Assurance Vieillesse et Sur-
vivants.
2BVG = Bundesgesetz ¨ uber die beruﬂiche Alters-, Hinterlassenen- und Invalidenvorsorge,
LPP = Loi f´ ed´ erale sur la pr´ evoyance professionnelle vieillesse, survivants et invalidit´ e.
3today can expect more than half of their combined ﬁrst and second pillar income
to come from the second. The third pillar predominantly covers self–employed
workers, but is also used as a tax–saving device for upper middle and high income
earners. The capital accumulated in the third pillar is almost always paid out
as a lump sum due to the already high degree of annuitization by the ﬁrst and
second pillar.
2.2 The ﬁrst pillar
The ﬁrst pillar aims at providing a basic subsistence level of income to all retired
residents in Switzerland. Its structure has changed considerably in 10 so–called
revisions during the last 50 years. However, since a large increase in the size of
the program in the late 60’s and early 70’s (in which period both payroll tax
and pension beneﬁts approximately doubled), the payroll tax rate has remained
unchanged, and the ratio between average pension beneﬁts and average per capita
wages has remained almost constant.
The main features of the ﬁrst pillar can be described as follows: Although
there is a small trust fund, the public pension system is a pay–as–you–go system,
in which the current young have to ﬁnance the pensions of the current old. The
system is ﬁnanced mainly with a proportional payroll tax on all labor income (i.e.,
without a cap), and an ear–marked fraction of the consumption tax (value added
tax). By law, 20% of total expenditures have to be ﬁnanced out of general federal
government revenues. Pension beneﬁts are paid out after the legal retirement age,
regardless of whether the agent leaves the workforce or not.
There is a limited tax–beneﬁt linkage in Switzerland, but the beneﬁt scheme
is relatively ﬂat in reality. More important for the determination of future bene-
ﬁts is the number of contribution years including those granted for child care.3 A
majority of retirees qualify for a pension close or equal to the maximum beneﬁt
level. As in most other countries, the ﬁrst pillar oﬀers some explicit and im-
plicit redistribution within and between generations and insurance against various
contingencies.4 Apart from the regular pension beneﬁts, AHV/AVS also avails
3The linkage between pre–retirement earnings and the beneﬁt level has become consider-
ably weaker in the last two decades. A large majority of (potential) beneﬁciaries with a full
contribution period are entitled to maximum beneﬁts, so that earnings history only matters
for people with low average wages and/or contribution gaps. In 1998, for example, an average
married couple received more than 92% of maximum beneﬁts.
4See B¨ utler 2002 and Table 1 for more details.
4means–tested supplemental beneﬁts. The combination of a relatively ﬂat beneﬁt
structure and supplementary beneﬁts have led to a low poverty rate among the
elderly in Switzerland,5 although there are still gaps for low–income earners.
Recent and ongoing revisions of the ﬁrst pillar have led to a number of im-
portant structural changes although the contribution rate and total expenditures
have remained basically unchanged. First, family/household beneﬁts have been
replaced by individual beneﬁts. Married couples’ entitlements are capped at 150%
of a single beneﬁt. This reduction takes into account that per capita expenses
are considerably lower in a two–people than in a single household. Married cou-
ples, on the other hand, beneﬁt from AHV/AVS’s survivor insurance (in favor of
widows only!) during the working period. The redistribution between single and
married individuals is thus small. Second, individuals with responsibilities for
children up to 16 years or other dependants are now entitled to (child–)care cred-
its. Third, contributions during marriage, including child–care credits, are split
between the spouses. This change led to a substantial improvement for divorced
women, but reduced the entitlements of couples with a non–working spouse and
few or no children. Fourth, the legal retirement age for women will be raised
stepwise from 62 to 64 years, and most probably to 65.
For a very long time, the ﬁrst pillar has been viewed as very stable, eﬃcient (at
reducing poverty in old age) and cheap (due to very low administration costs of
≈ 1/3% of beneﬁts). But as most PAYG systems in Europe, the Swiss ﬁrst pillar
is plagued by unfavorable demographics due to lower mortality and fertility rates
which have led to a strong increase in the old–age dependency ratio.6 If current
levels of contributions and beneﬁts are left unchanged, the present value of future
contributions falls short of the present value of future claims by about a third.
There are virtually no reserves — the AHV/AVS trust–fund makes up for less
than one year’s worth of beneﬁts — to cushion the anticipated population aging.
There is no consensus in current political debate as to how to ﬁx the ﬁnancing
problem apart from an increase in the earmarked VAT. It is important to note
5The last comprehensive poverty study in Switzerland dates back to 1992 (Leu, Burri &
Priester (1997)). It reports a poverty rate of 5.6% for the whole population, and of only 3.6%
for people beyond the legal retirement age. Recent numbers suggest that the general picture
has remained unchanged.
6Foreign immigrants, which make up approximately 20% of the work force, are net contrib-
utors at present. An increase in immigration is not really considered an option due to political
resistance and the fact that the fertility rate of second generation immigrants is very close to
the one of Swiss citizens.
5that policy makers face strong political constraints for potential reforms. Any
change of the law can be (and usually is) challenged by an optional referendum.
The public thus possesses veto power for all reform of the current social security
system. This is crucial as the median voter, who is approximately 48 today, is
anticipated to have an age of 52 by the year 2020.
The retirement age observed in reality is below the statutory retirement age
albeit to a somewhat lesser degree than in other European countries. According
to a recent SAKE/ESPA study,7 a majority of Swiss men (53%) and 44% of Swiss
women retire before legal retirement age of 65 for men or 62 for women. The
outcome is striking in view of the fact that the ﬁrst pillar does not yet oﬀer early
retirement. Many of those (predominantly middle and high income) beneﬁciaries
have received generous early retirement packages from their occupational pension
provider, often with additional beneﬁts until age 65/62 to bridge the time to the
legal retirement age. Figure 2 shows the distribution of retirement ages collected
from 10 Swiss occupational pension funds. The data exhibit a wide variety of
retirement ages, with a triple–peak proﬁle for men and a double–peak proﬁle for
women at ages 60, 62, and (for men only) 65. The peaks at 60 and 62 correspond
to the lowest age for which early retirement packages are oﬀered at relatively
favorable conditions in occupational pension funds.
Figure 2
2.3 The second pillar: Occupational pension plans
The Swiss second pillar, after a long history as a private occupational pension
system became mandatory in 1985. As Figure 3 shows, a sizeable fraction of the
working force had been covered already before such plans were mandated by law.
Although Figure 3 overstates the true coverage rate due to some double–counting,
the numbers convey a relatively high coverage especially for male workers.
The second pillar’s main goal is to maintain the pre–retirement living standard
together with the beneﬁts stemming from the ﬁrst pillar. Apart from retirement
income, the second pillar also provides insurance for disability and survivors of
insured men (but not of women) during the accumulation period. A detailed de-
scription of all aspects of the second pillar is thus beyond the scope of this paper.
7SAKE / ESPA is a longitudinal (rolling panel) study of the Swiss labor market, but also
covers individuals beyond the retirement age.
6The interested reader is referred to Queissar & Vittas (2000, especially concern-
ing institutional details) and the oﬃcial publications of the Swiss Bundesamt f¨ ur
Statistik (2002).
Figure 3
2.3.1 Organization and ﬁnancing
Occupational pension plans are organized, in general, by the employer. The
employer can choose several forms of organization, the two polar cases being an
autonomous pension fund, on the one hand, and a contract with an insurer, on the
other hand. As a consequence (and also for historical reasons), the system is very
segmented. There are more than 10’000 funds, though this number is decreasing
rapidly. When occupational pension plans were mandated, all schemes had to be
deﬁned beneﬁts (DB). By now, and after an early change in the law, more than
75% are deﬁned contributions (DC) Administration costs are low for international
standards, approximately 8% of beneﬁts, but high compared to AHV/AVS.
The second pillar is designed to be integrated with the ﬁrst pillar. As the
latter provides a basic level of income, the BVG/LPP only insures income above a
certain threshold level, the so–called coordination oﬀset which is equal to a yearly
maximum single AHV/AVS pension (in 2003: 25’320 CHF ≈ 17’000 EURO ≈
18’500 USD). There is, in principle, also a maximum insured earning which is
equal to three times the maximum single AHV/AVS beneﬁt. Pension providers
are free to oﬀer insurance for income below or above the two threshold levels.
While most do for income greater than the maximum — many companies do not
even have an upper level — very few do for income below the threshold level. This
lower threshold explains the much lower coverage for female workers (Figure 3),
who often work part–time and have lower average wages than men.
Contributions are a certain percentage of coordinated (= insured) salary of
which the employer has to pay at least half. The law also mandates minimum con-
tribution rates, which increase considerably with age (from 7% at age 25 to 18%
from age 55 onwards), but leaves the details to the individual pension providers.
These so–called age retirement credits are accumulated as retirement assets and
bear an interest rate. The Swiss Federal Council determines the (nominal!) min-
imum rate of return. This minimum rate requirement remained at 4% for 17
years (from 1985 to the end of 2002, 3.25% since 2003), despite the fact that
market returns showed considerable variability and exceeded this 4% level by a
7large margin most of the time. As will be shown below in section 3 this feature
of the Swiss system was at the root of the recent pension crisis.
The accrued capital is fully portable (with minor deductions especially for
short employment spells) when the insured individual changes the employer. By
law, an employee changing the ﬁrm gets the accumulated total contributions
accrued at the minimum interest rate. The law is silent as to how accumulated
reserves have to be distributed. In practice this meant that job changers got less
than their fair share during the high return episodes. This feature was considered
an important obstacle to mobility on the Swiss labor market in the 1990s. At the
present low market returns and wide–spread underfunding of pension providers,
on the other hand, the requirement could potentially induce employees to ﬂee an
underfunded pension provider, i.e., an employer attached to such a provider.
2.3.2 Insured beneﬁts
Upon attainment of retirement age, the accumulated capital can be withdrawn
either as a monthly life–long annuity or as a lump sum provided the pension fund
allows for this option.8 Old age pension beneﬁts are strictly proportional to the
accumulated retirement assets (retirement credits plus accrued interest). The
accumulated capital K is translated into a yearly pension B using the conversion
factor γ:
B = γK.
This conversion also applies to DB plans; the fund has to make sure that enough
capital is accumulated to cover the claims made based on previous income. Bene-
ﬁts are ﬁxed annuities in principle, but the law states that pension providers have
to adjust current old age beneﬁts to inﬂation within the scope of their ﬁnancial
possibilities.
The conversion factor presently amounts to 7.2% and is determined by the
Swiss Federal Council. This number was constructed using a (technical) interest
rate of 4% (the legal minimum requirement for 17 years) and somewhat opti-
mistic — from the pension provider’s perspective — mortality tables. As Table 2
demonstrates — using most recent mortality tables —, this factor together with
a market interest rate of 4% delivers an average money’s worth ratio (MWR)
close to one. With this presently unrealistically high discount factor, there is no
8Focusing on annuities I again abstract from beneﬁts (disability/survivor) during the accu-
mulation period.
8room for increases (e.g., inﬂation adjustments) in the yearly beneﬁt for already
retired individuals. It is thus not surprising that the private market for annuities
in Switzerland is relatively thin. Private insurers are simply unable to oﬀer the
same deal to their customers, especially if they are bound to face adverse selection
due to information asymmetries with respect to mortality rates.
The BVG/LPP mandates joint annuities; the conversion factor is the same for
everybody irrespective of gender, family status or income. Children under age 18
(or under age 25 if still dependent) of retired persons get an additional pension of
20% of the main claimant’s beneﬁt. When a retired man dies, his widow receives
a beneﬁt amounting to 60% of the previous pension, his dependent children a
beneﬁt of 20% each. As obvious from Table 2 this leads to sizeable diﬀerences in
the MWR, as will be explained in more details in section 4 below.
Table 2
When given the choice between an annuity and a lump sum,9 most individ-
uals choose the former although lump sum withdrawals enjoy a preferential tax
treatment — the present value of taxes can be up to three times higher with
the annuity, depending on the canton of residence. This is presumably also a
consequence of the very high MWR oﬀered by the second pillar.
2.3.3 Regulation and supervision
The Swiss second pillar is heavily regulated in both the accumulation and the de-
cumulation phase. Apart from the above mentioned requirements concerning the
minimum rate, the contribution rates and the survivor beneﬁts, the BVG/LPP
and its amendments also put limits on possible asset structures. These limits on
investment, which are also a function of a fund’s asset & liability structure, have
been relaxed considerably, however, so that they hardly ever bind in practice.
In the pay–out phase, the pension fund’s hands are tied as well. The con-
version factor can only be relaxed in extraordinary circumstances and in general
only for the part exceeding the upper coordination limit. Pensions of current
retired beneﬁciaries cannot be reduced unless the law is changed. While this
constraint provides a high degree of security in old age, the grandfathering of
existing pensioners potentially goes at the expense of future generations as will
be argued below.
9See also section 4 for more details.
9Most importantly, by law, the pension provider must guarantee that it can
fulﬁll its obligations at all times. The law states that the pension institution
must regulate its systems for contributions and funding in such a way that the
beneﬁts can be paid when due, but does not specify more precise requirements.
Other aspects of regulation concern the organization and the administration
of the pension fund, impose accounting standards and specify audit requirements.
Supervision of occupational pension institutions is overseen by the Swiss Fed-
eral Council. Pension institutions without national or international importance
are supervised by cantonal supervisory authorities.10 The Federal Oﬃce for So-
cial Insurance supervises the cantonal supervisory authorities as well as pension
providers with national or international importance. The diﬀerent layers and the
large segmentation of the supervisory authority potentially reduce the quality
and transparency of supervision.
The Federal Oﬃce for Social Insurance is also in charge of the so–called Sup-
pletory Institution,11 and even more importantly, of the BVG/LPP Security Fund.
The Security Fund’s most important task is to act as a reinsurance institution,
i.e., to secure beneﬁts in accordance with the rules for the beneﬁciaries of insolvent
pension providers. In contrast to what may be expected of such an institution,
the fund does not primarily accumulate reserves,12 but is ﬁnanced on a pay–
as–you–go base, with a contribution rate of 0.1% of the coordinated earnings at
present. To cover its obligations in bad times the Security Fund will have to
increase the contribution rate when the individual funds face greater diﬃculties
ﬁnancing their primary obligations. Given that occupational pensions are man-
dated by law, an important question is whether the government has the moral
obligations to guarantee the beneﬁts when the Security Fund is unable to do so.
Another question is whether an employer can aﬀord to let his fund go bust.
Up to now, little emphasis has been placed on transparency. The pension
providers have to inform the insured about their anticipated beneﬁts in old age
or when disabled, but do not have to inform them about their ﬁnancial situation.
The lack of transparency has two important aspects. First, the insurance compa-
10The 26 cantons are the Swiss states. They enjoy a considerably independence from the
confederation in many important areas such as tax setting, schooling, and regulation.
11The Suppletory Institution covers voluntary insured individuals as well as employees if the
employer has not aﬃliated with an occupational pension provider despite legal provisions.
12In the past, its reserves have always been less than 1/10 of the total accumulated retirement
assets in Switzerland, and were even negative at times.
10nies may be insuﬃciently supervised and may decide on investment/contribution
strategies that are detrimental to the interest of the insured worker. Second,
individuals that are not aware of potential ﬁnancial shortfalls of their fund, may
ﬁnd out only at a time when they do not have much time left to make up for the
losses.
2.3.4 A short appraisal of the system
The long history of the scheme is reﬂected in the large capital stock accumulated
to date. As a percentage of GDP the capital stock amounts to approximately
120% of GDP. Although coverage is restricted, the second pillar insures a rela-
tively high percentage of the labor force.
In contrast to the ﬁrst pillar, the BVG/LPP is based on outdated models of
the labor market and the family structure. The coordination oﬀset is not reduced
for part–time employment. Widowers can usually not claim a beneﬁt after the
death of an insured married female individual even when the wife had been the
main bread winner of the family. The structure of the BVG/LPP thus has an
important catch. When Queissar and Vittas (2000) conclude that the second
pillar is “remarkably well integrated” with the ﬁrst, this is again only true for
a male married single earner. The system does not take account of the many
cohabiting unmarried parents with children, part–time workers or job–sharers as
well as homosexual couples, who all get a much lower degree of insurance for their
contributions than married men.
Money’s worth ratios of the Swiss occupational pension system are very high
except for single men.13 A constant discount factor of 4% — this corresponds to
the minimum rate requirement — together with a non–increasing pension delivers
an average MWR only marginally smaller than one. If one adds a moderate
growth of pension beneﬁts of one percent annually, the MWR is already close
to 1.1. Taking the term structure of interest rates reported in James & Song
(2001),14 the picture looks even more favorable for the pensioners — and worse
for the insurers.
13This fact has already been pointed out by other authors. See, for example, James & Song
(2001) and Davies (2003).
14James & Song (2001) argue that the used term structure of interest rates is probably too
conservative, i.e. too low. But Swiss real interest rates have traditionally been considerably
below European and US real interest rate (the diﬀerence is of the order of 1.5%), discounting
interest rates below 4% seem very plausible).
11As will be argued below in section 3, overly generous pension and survivor
beneﬁts together with opaque rules of regulation and supervision has put a serious
threat to the second pillar.
3 The recent (and ongoing) Swiss pension crisis
The Swiss pension system has had a long successful history and has enjoyed con-
siderable international praise from both an academic as a political side. Funda-
mental changes to the system have been rare and contributions and replacement
rates have basically stayed constant for many decades. Consequently the public
awareness of potential shortcomings of the fully funded part was weak at best,
reinforced by the fact that little emphasis had been put on suﬃcient information
and transparency.
3.1 An overview of the crisis
Market returns on both the bond and stock market had been markedly above the
minimum rate of 4% during the early and mid nineties. Average bond and stock
returns from 1990 to the end of 2001 amounted to 5.5% and 12%, respectively
(see Figure 4). In 2002, however, Swiss pension providers suﬀered a loss of
approximately 10% on average. But even when one includes the recent down–
turn of the stock market, the average return on stocks since 1990 were still 8.4%
to the end of 2002.
Figure 4
“Excess returns” in good times were often spent on adjusting pension beneﬁts
not only to inﬂation but also to wage growth or on ﬁnancing generous early
retirement packages. Another way to distribute high returns was a reduction of
contribution rates. Many pension funds did not even collect contributions for
some period of time or reimbursed employees and employer at the end of the
year. Recommendations to accumulate higher reserves for rainy days were left as
unheard as claims to adjust the minimum rate to the high market returns. The
few advocates of prudential reserve management were not really taken seriously.
The public woke when the problem ridden airline company Swissair announced
that it reclaimed several millions Swiss francs of paid contributions out of the
12fund. The former CEO of SAir group argued that “two thirds of the contributions
are paid by the employer. Thus also a part of the fund’s reserves belongs to the
employer”.15 The justiﬁcation of this claim was that reserves do not belong
to the fund, but to the contributors, i.e., the employees and the employer. In
fact Swissair’s claim was nothing more than what had been considered common
practice during the nineties. But by then ﬁnancial prospects were less favorable
(the market return had already started to fall), and — more importantly for the
public perception — it involved a ﬁrm with huge ﬁnancial diﬃculties.
In March 2000, the Swiss Federal Council announced that the pension funds
would need more resources to fulﬁl the future pension requirements. However,
this need was motivated rather by realized and projected increases in longevity
than by lower returns. In fact, the Swiss Federal Council suggested a reduction
in the conversion factor or an increase in the minimum rate from 4 to 4.8%, but
realized that the latter might not be feasible and might lead to a deterioration of
the ﬁnancial situation of many pension funds. The reduction in the conversion
factor, moreover, was scheduled to be implemented in little steps over a 20 years
period.
Since 2000, the situation has changed dramatically. Mainly as a consequence
of the stock market downturn, market returns had fallen below the 4% mini-
mum return requirement. The average degree of funding obligations of pension
providers has decreased to approximately 90% with the market return and has led
to an underfunding of many pension funds. Mid 2002 and under the guidance of
the company Swiss Life (Rentenanstalt), the life insurers (which predominantly
organize pension plans for smaller and medium enterprises) requested a reduc-
tion of the minimum return to 3% or less. After what was publicly perceived to
be an unprecedented lobbying act of the life insurers, the Swiss Federal Council
conceded to this request and announced to it would reduce the minimum return
requirement to 3.25% as of January 1, 2003.
This announcement caused a public outcry that went far beyond the usual
level of indignation in Switzerland. Life insurers were accused of attempted
“theft” of pension beneﬁts (Rentenklau). Observers attributed the strong re-
action not primarily to a lack of comprehension for the measure taken, but to
other factors. One factor were scandals that concerned two well known pension
15The citation (originally in German) is taken from the weakly Swiss journal Cash (March 5,
2000): “Zwei Drittel der Beitr¨ age stammen von den Arbeitgebern. Demzufolge geh¨ oren auch
die Reserven zu einem Teil dem Arbeitgeber.”
13providers.16 The more important reason, however, was an almost complete ab-
sence of transparency and the fact that potentially huge proﬁts during the 90s
that should have been used to accumulate reserves seemed to have disappeared.
As Figure 4 demonstrates it would have been easy for pension companies to
cushion a fall in the market interest rate — at least for a certain time.17
The debate is going on. A minimum rate equal or slightly below the market
return guarantees that the pension provider can accumulate retirement assets
at the rate mandated by the law. But not only the accumulation, but also
the decumulation phase is aﬀected by a change in the prevailing market return.
Regardless of any minimum rate requirements, the market cannot always generate
a return on accumulated retirement assets that would be necessary to maintain
the mandated pension beneﬁts from a given capital stock, especially as Swiss
MWRs are very high. A lower minimum rate thus only solves part of the ﬁnancial
problem in low return periods as will be argued below.
A further reduction of the minimum return below the 3.25% as well as a
reduction of the conversion factor, and possibly even of beneﬁts of already retired
individuals are still open issues. Politically a reduction in the conversion factor
(and even more so of current pension beneﬁts) seems diﬃcult to achieve, however.
Contributors and current pensioners are not willing to bring what is generally
perceived as yet another sacriﬁce.
3.2 Minimum rate requirement and the conversion factor:
A simple analysis
The market return has two major implications for a fully funded pension plan.
Firstly, the higher the return the faster the retirement capital will accumulate,
and a lower contribution rate is needed to achieve a certain capital stock at
retirement. Secondly, the higher the return, the higher the annuity that can be
paid out from a given level of retirement assets. This section provides a simple
16Top managers of a big life insurer were reported to have borrowed large amounts of company
money at very favorable conditions to invest in an investment fond resulting in large purely
private proﬁts. Two former CEOs of an international ﬁrm allegedly used the company’s pension
fund to process huge golden parachute payments in order to beneﬁt from a very favorable tax
treatment.
17This, of course, does not apply to pension providers entering the market (or new plans
oﬀered) after mid 2000. This fact had been used as an argument in favor of a decrease in the
minimum rate.
14formal analysis of how a permanent reduction in the market return aﬀects MWRs
for diﬀerent generations under the current Swiss regulatory setup. Recall that
the minimum rate at which pension providers have to accumulate retirement is
ﬁxed by law, and that retirement beneﬁts are a ﬁxed fraction (the conversion
factor) of accumulated retirement assets upon retirement.
To simplify the analysis, I assume that the fall in the interest rate is permanent
and that the conversion factor and current pension beneﬁts are left unchanged.18 I
also assume that the previous market interest rate had been equal to the minimum
return of 4%, and that the new market interest rate is 3%. Contributions are
assumed to grow at 2% annually accounting for wage growth and increasing
contribution rates with age.
Figure 5 shows the MWRs for an “average” individual over the life–cycle
for various combinations of market and mandated interest rates.19 The MWRs
reported For younger individuals the numbers reported in Figure 5 are MWR for
deferred annuities, with the pay–out period starting at age 62. When the market
interest rate is equal to the minimum rate of 4%, the MWR is equal to one for
all ages, and the pension providers break even in the absence of administration
costs.
Let us now consider a permanent fall in the market interest rate to 3%. Taking
this value to discount pension payments and retirement credits, Figure 5 reveals
that the resulting MWR is considerably above one, as the present value of future
pension beneﬁts exceeds the capital at retirement by approximately 10%. If the
minimum rate stays above the market rate (solid line and stars in Figure 5),
this eﬀect is reinforced by the fact that pension providers have to credit a higher
interest rate than the market interest rate during the contribution period. This
would lead to an insolvency of the pension provider sooner or later even in the
presence of reserves.
But even if the minimum rate is reduced to the new market return (dashed
line in Figure 5), Mars exceed one for all ages. The reason is that the present
value of pension beneﬁts at retirement is considerably above the capital stock (on
which the beneﬁts are based) at retirement. Thus if retirement beneﬁts are to be
18As argued above, a reduction in the conversion factor is more diﬃcult politically than a
reduction in the minimum return as it aﬀects vested claims more directly.
19To do this, I pooled mortality and survival rates for male/female and married/single indi-
viduals. As the resulting MWR for a market interest rate equal to a mandated interest rate of
4% is very close to 1, the numbers in Figure 5 are normalized to one for this scenario.
15left untouched, the pension providers need an additional margin to ﬁnance their
liabilities.
If the conversion factor cannot be adjusted, the solvency of the pension fund
can only be restored by an interest rate on retirement credits considerably below
the market interest rate. A fraction of the potential return on the working gen-
eration’s capital stock will then be diverted to ﬁnance the claims of the retired
individuals. A suﬃcient funding can, therefor, only be achieved with a sizeable
redistribution between living generations as is reﬂected in Figure 5. The eﬀect on
the MWRs is largest for middle–aged individuals. These contributors see their
already accumulated pension capital and their retirement credits grow at too low
a rate. The accumulation deﬁcit due to the foregone return on accumulated re-
tirement credits exceeds the potential beneﬁt of too high a conversion factor upon
retirement for the current middle–aged. For younger individuals the trade–oﬀ is
more favorable as contributions are concentrated towards the end of working life.
As a consequence, the present value of the accumulation deﬁcit due to too low
a return on retirement credits is smaller for them. The closer to retirement age,
on the other hand, the more important in present value terms is the favorable
conversion between accumulated retirement credits and pension beneﬁts.
Figure 5
3.3 Preliminary lessons from the crisis
Fluctuations in the market return are one of the main challenges pension providers
and regulators face. There are two polar ways to deal with these ﬂuctuations from
an ex ante perspective. The ﬁrst would be to let individuals bear the market
risk, leading to a relatively transparent pension environment, but jeopardizing
the goal of providing suﬃcient insurance in old age. The second would be to aim
at a stable contribution/beneﬁt regime, transferring investment risks to pension
providers and across generations (as well as potentially the government as a
reinsurer of last resort). If the emphasis is on stability of acquired claims at least
to a certain degree, ﬂuctuation reserves must be sheltered from political pressure.
The fundamental trade–oﬀ the regulatory authority has to take a stand on is thus
between ﬂexibility and insurance of pension claims.
The Swiss second pillar has relied greatly on a stability of acquired claims,
requiring a minimum return which seemed realistic at least in the medium run.
16In retrospect, the ﬁnancial problems of many Swiss pension providers could have
been avoided at least temporarily by an accumulation of suﬃcient reserves. But
the system left the management of “excess returns” basically at the discretion
of pension providers, while no real precautions were prescribed for the downside
risk. The requirement to accumulate enough reserves remained opaque. Many
pension providers failed to accumulate enough reserves to cushion ﬂuctuations in
the market return on their own account, while the regulatory authority remained
silent.
The deﬁnition of property rights in the Swiss second pillar has been fuzzy;
the link between residual control rights and residual claims is very weak. The
Swiss basically have relied on the political process as a complement to incomplete
contracts. But as the experience has demonstrated, discretionary policy changes
can lead to a piecemeal regulation that may be detrimental to both the eﬃciency
and the viability of the system. A lesson that can be drawn from the recent
crisis is that transparent adjustment rules should avail for potential crisis. Under
pressure, it is more diﬃcult to recognize that various components of the regulatory
setup — such as the conversion factor and the minimum rate requirement in the
Swiss case — are aﬀected by the same underlying market forces. Most likely,
crisis management under time pressure also leads to a one–sided distribution of
the rescue burden at the expense of certain groups of insured individuals.
Even if the system emphasizes insurance of pension claims, regulation should
be able to account of permanent changes in the underlying parameters, notably
the market returns (aging of baby–boomers) and changes in mortality rates. In
the long run, the very high MWRs the Swiss system currently oﬀers will not be
sustainable as the ﬁnancial margin for pension providers is simply too small.
Inadequate regulation and supervision is often closely related to insuﬃcient
transparency. Given that it is inherently diﬃcult to assess the ﬁnancial situation
of a fund even for experts, the regulators should aim at the highest degree of
transparency possible. It seems as if — in the absence of suﬃcient information
— Swiss insured individuals have trusted the regulatory setup and have not found
it worth the eﬀort to acquire additional information. Information asymmetry is
thus somewhat endogenous.
The Swiss episode also highlights political economy considerations of pension
fund regulation. The ﬁrst is an important asymmetry in the political process if
adjustments are not rule–based. Claims to increase the minimum return during
high return episodes had been ignored while the fall in the market rate led to a
17(for Swiss standards) almost immediate adjustment. The second consideration is
that long term planning (and regulation) are diﬃcult in the presence of political
pressure to increase beneﬁts when capital reserves are high.
4 The design of pay–out options
The design of pay–out options as well as the degree of ﬂexibility oﬀered to pen-
sioners in a fully funded pension system are crucial questions policy makers face.
The two most important pay–out options in a fully funded pension plan are usu-
ally the choice between a lump sum and an annuity, as well as the choice between
single and joint annuities. Many Swiss pension plans (notably a majority of
DC plans) oﬀer at least a partial choice between a lump sum and an annuity.
Provided the individual chooses to annuitize upon retirement, however, there is
no choice in Switzerland; the beneﬁt comes in the form of a joint–and survivor
annuity without a compensating increase in beneﬁts for those without potential
eligible survivors. Below, I will explore these two features of the Swiss system in
turn.
4.1 Joint annuities — but not for all
The Swiss second pillar insists on joint–and survivor annuities for married men,
but not for women or non–married couples. Given a certain capital stock upon
retirement, the resulting pension beneﬁt is independent on gender, marital status
or the age diﬀerence between eligible spouses. Thus single individuals and mar-
ried women do not get higher beneﬁts to compensate for the absence of eligible
survivors.20
The most popular rationale for joint annuities is to prevent poverty among
elderly widows. On the other hand, the prevalence of joint annuities even before
the second pillar became mandatory in Switzerland hints at the fact that the
“normal” insured worker had been male and married until well into the seven-
ties. Legislation in 1985 just continued what had been common practice before
although the situation had already started to change by then. At present, the
20As mentioned above, the second pillar also pays out beneﬁts to widows and (semi–)orphans
before the insured individual reaches the retirement age. This section abstracts from this pos-
sibility. It is important to mention, however, that survivor beneﬁts before retirement increase
the intragenerational distribution in favor of married men.
18single earner model is no more valid for a majority of Swiss families, with the
divorce rate climbing to more than 40% and Switzerland having a relatively high
female labor market participation.
To investigate the impact of this joint–annuity requirement I have computed
money’s worth ratios as a function of gender, marital status and the age diﬀerence
between spouses based on the most recent population mortality tables. Survival
probabilities depend on gender and marital status, and the joint probability of
survival is obviously a function of the age diﬀerence d between the spouses. For
expositional reasons, both the discount rate ρ and the yearly increase in the
beneﬁt level g are assumed constant.
For a married individual with an eligible spouse, the present value (PV) of all
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where Pr[·,·](t) denotes the probability of a beneﬁt inducing marital status at
age t, conditional on the main claimant being alive and married at age J.21.
The parameter λ denotes the fraction of the main claimant’s pension the surviv-
ing spouse gets after the death of the former. For non–married individuals the
computation is similar.
As the yearly beneﬁt is B = γK the money’s worth ratio (which is equal to
PV/K is simply
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+P r [ M dead,Salive](t) × λ.
The resulting MWRs are reported in Table 2 and Figure 6. For married
individuals in Table 2 it is assumed that the wife is three years younger than the
husband as is approximately the case in reality. As mortality diﬀerences between
single, widowed and divorced agents above age 65 are very similar, MWRs are
only reported for single men and women in Table 2. I have also abstracted from
the (very small) probability of (re)marriage after age 65.
21This implies that Pr[M alive,Salive](J) = 1, and that for any t ≥ J,
Pr[M alive,Salive](t)+P r [ M alive,Sdead](t)+P r [ M dead,Salive](t)+
Pr[M dean,Sdead](t)=1 .
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As is obvious from Table 2, MWRs diﬀer considerably across marital status
and gender. The diﬀerence between married and single men is mainly driven by
the present value of widow beneﬁts which make up nearly 20% of total expected
beneﬁts. The rest, 8 to 10%, can be explained by diﬀerences in life expectancy.
Diﬀerential mortality is relatively unimportant for women. The discussed intro-
duction of a widower beneﬁt would increase the MWR for married women by
approximately 4%. This low increase is due to longevity diﬀerences between men
and women and the fact, that husbands are generally older. Taking present la-
bor market participation and wages of married women, a widower pension would
increase pension funds’ expenditures by less than half a percent on average.
The fact that widow beneﬁts make up for a relatively large fraction of antici-
pated pension beneﬁts for married men also explains the sensitivity of the MWR
with respect to the age diﬀerence between spouses as demonstrated in Figure 6.22
The reported numbers can only convey an incomplete picture of the variation
of MWR across diﬀerent groups of the population. In this context, two important
aspects are worth mention. Firstly, potentially eligible children are not included
in the analysis. The reported numbers thus underestimate the true MWR for
married men. Although women may also claim children beneﬁts in theory, the
probability of them doing so is very small for obvious reasons. Secondly, diﬀeren-
tial mortality is only accounted for with respect to marital status, but not with
respect to income. This eﬀect increases the variation of MWR especially among
men.23 Note that richer men are more likely to be married, and if married, are
more likely to be married to a younger woman and have eligible children upon
retirement.
4.2 The choice between a lump sum and an annuity
The choice between a lump–sum capital payment upon retirement or a life–long
annuity is oﬀered by many DC pension plans in Switzerland. As a consequence
of the high fragmentation of the second pillar reliable information on individual
22The analysis neglects the fact that couples usually coordinate their retirement decision.
See Falkinger & Winter–Ebmer (1996) for a nice illustration of this eﬀect.
23There are no detailed studies of diﬀerential mortality with respect to income in Switzerland.
The situation is likely to be very close to countries like the Netherlands (Nelissen (1999)) and
Germany (Reil–Held (2000)).
20decisions is diﬃcult to obtain. We do have, however, some data from a limited
pilot study, analyzed in B¨ utler & Teppa (2002).24
The expected return for each of these two options depends crucially on an
agent’s gender, his/her expected life–time and marital status (see also Table 2),
the presence of children under 18 (for which a substantial supplementary beneﬁt
is due), as well as his/her perceived ability to manage the assets in case of a
one–time capital payment.
Present value considerations would predict the following patterns: Because
(single and married) women live longer than single men on average, the former
should choose an annuity, and the latter a lump–sum capital payment. Married
men, like women, should also prefer an annuity due to the high value of the
provided survivor insurance. As the expected life–span is correlated with wealth
(diﬀerential mortality), richer pensioners should opt for an annuity, and poorer
for a one–time capital payment. Richer agents, however, also beneﬁt more from
the preferential tax treatment of capital payments,25 and are potentially more
capable of managing a large fund. Together with the desire to leave bequests,26
these factors may oﬀset the advantage of an annuity for the more aﬄuent to a
certain degree.
Despite data limitations, a number of interesting results can be drawn from the
data base. Most importantly, the data analyzed clearly exhibit an ”acquiescence
bias”, meaning that a large majority of retirees chooses the standard option upon
retirement, despite sizeable diﬀerences across diﬀerent plans.27 As in most plans,
the standard option is the annuity, only 23% (13%) withdraw their accumulated
retirement assets entirely (partially) in the form of a lump sum.
24The data also contains some information concerning early retirement. The corresponding
ﬁndings, however, are even more preliminary than for the choice between an annuity and a
lump sum as the data are contaminated by various factors. Nevertheless, two results stand out
to be robust. The ﬁrst is that early retirement seems to be the dominating option regardless
of individual characteristics. If early retirement is possible, most people opt for it. The sec-
ond result is that within the analyzed plans, the “rich”, i.e., pensioners with higher levels of
accumulated pension capital, often retire earlier than the “poor”.
25In Switzerland, there is clearly a tax advantage to withdraw the accumulated pension
wealth in the form of a lump sum. This eﬀect is much stronger for high and very high levels of
capital.
26The higher the annuity, the lower the marginal utility of consumption. People might prefer
to hold their pension wealth in the form of capital to be able to bequeath it to their children.
27For further references concerning the acquiescence bias and other choice anomalies in funded
pension plans see Benartzi & Thaler (2001) and Hurd (1999).
21We also ﬁnd that those who do deviate from the standard option generally
do so as expected from theory. Not surprisingly, married men with children
always choose the annuity. The probability of taking the capital lump sum option
shows a U–shaped dependence on total capital at retirement. For low levels
of accumulated capital the likelihood to withdraw it is decreasing. The most
plausible reasons are diﬀerential mortality and magnitude eﬀects. The latter
eﬀect is well documented in the literature (Shane, Loewenstein & O’Donogue
(2002)). A relatively small amount of money is more likely to be withdrawn in
the form of a lump sum, as it would only guarantee a low annuity. For higher levels
of accumulated capital the attractiveness of (partially) withdrawing the capital
as a lump sum is again increasing. This can be well explained by the preferential
tax treatment, investment opportunities, and the desire to leave bequests.
At ﬁrst sight the ﬁndings contradict James & Song (2001) who conclude that
people frequently prioritize investment choice over longevity assurance. Almost
two thirds of Swiss pensioners fully annuitize their retirement assets although the
ﬁrst pillar provides a subsistence level of annuitization and although the tax on
lump sum withdrawals is up to three times smaller. The main reason for this
ﬁnding — apart from the above mentioned acquiescence bias — probably lies in
the very high money’s worth ratios (still) oﬀered by the system.
5 Conclusions
One of the most important lessons to be drawn from the recent developments in
Switzerland has been that a high degree of conﬁdence into a fully funded pension
system, even when it had been built up over many decades, can be shattered
in a very short time span. The ongoing crisis demonstrates not only the noto-
riously diﬃcult long–term planning and regulation but also the importance of
transparency and an adequate information of the public. As pension contracts
spanning over several decades are mandated by law, property rights need to be
well deﬁned and a high standards of regulation and supervision are indispens-
able. The Swiss case has shown that there is considerable political pressure to
rescue underfunded pension companies. The system should, therefore, also avail
reinsurance, especially for beneﬁts covering basic needs in old age.
As a consequence of the recent crisis, other interesting aspects of the Swiss
system are likely to be ignored. The second pillar in Switzerland usually pro-
22vides pension beneﬁts not only in an intermediate income range, but also for
high incomes. This means that basically the same rules for (survivor) beneﬁts
apply regardless of income, potentially leading to substantial (regressive) redis-
tribution not intended by law. The factual non–separation of mandatory and
non–mandatory parts of income provision in old age also potentially impedes the
restructuring of a fund in ﬁnancial diﬃculties. On the other hand, if the aim is
to prevent poverty in old age (as much as poverty among widows), it is indis-
pensable to open up second pillar pension plans for low income earners and part
time workers.
Another important feature of a fully funded pension system is the design of
pay–out options in the decumulation phase. The combination of mandated joint
annuities with a (in general unlimited) choice between a lump–sum withdrawal
and an annuity in Switzerland is certainly not optimal. The former, introduced
to prevent poverty among widows, today reinforces the redistribution from single
to, on average more aﬄuent, married beneﬁciaries. The lump–sum option, on the
other hand, potentially undermines the insurance of longevity. The system should
thus be ﬂexible enough to take into account socio–economic changes. Options
that satisfy the requirements today might not be the ones that do so when the
current contributors retire.
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251. Pillar: “AHV/AVS” 2. Pillar: “BVG/LPP”
Goal subsistence living standard
Financing principle pay–as–you–go fully funded
Financing sources labor income (≈ 70%) labor income
general taxation (20%)
VAT (≈ 10%)
Employee / Employer 50% / 50% ≤ 50% / ≥ 50%
Contribution rate (payroll) 8.4% 7–18%
Provision / Organization government ﬁrms & insurance companies
Administration costs ≈ 1/3% ≈ 8%
(as % of contributions)
Tax–beneﬁt linkage weak, DB proportional, DC
(relatively ﬂat) (some DB)
Form of beneﬁts individual annuity joint annuity or lump sum
Universality universal coverage restricted coverage
Accounts none collective
Redistribution:
– Intergenerational + older generations + older generations
– Intragen. explicit + poor, (+ women) + married individuals
– Intragen. implicit +w o m e n +r i c h ,-s i n g l em e n
Insurance also for: survivors survivors, disabled
Reinsurance government Security Fund, (government?)
Table 1: Switzerland’s two pillars of income support during retirement. There is
considerable variation among second pillar institutions, however. A + (-) before
a subgroup of the population denotes a redistribution in favor (at the expense) of
the respective group. Implicit redistribution in favor of women will and with the
next revision of social security law.
26Gender Marital R.A. r = .04 r = .04 r =E J r =E J
g =0 g = .01 g =0 g = .01
Male Single 65 0.73 0.79 0.82 0.89
Male Married (-3) 65 1.01 1.11 1.16 1.28
Female Single 65 0.95 1.04 1.08 1.19
Female Married (no) 65 0.98 1.08 1.12 1.24
Female Married (+3) 65 1.02 1.13 1.18 1.31
Male Single 62 0.80 0.87 0.90 0.98
Male Married (-3) 62 1.08 1.20 1.25 1.40
Female Single 62 1.02 1.14 1.18 1.31
Female Married (no) 62 1.05 1.17 1.22 1.36
Female Married (+3) 62 1.10 1.23 1.27 1.42
Table 2: Money’s worth ratios as a function of marital status and retirement age
(=R.A.) that qualiﬁes for full beneﬁts. For married individuals, the number in
parenthesis denotes the age diﬀerence between the spouses, or indicates the case
in which no survivor beneﬁt is available (this is the standard option for married
women). As mortality diﬀerences are small between divorced, widowed and single
agents, only single is reported. See section 4 for details.











Figure 1: Accumulated pension capital as a fraction of GDP in Switzerland.



































Figure 2: Distributions of age at retirement for men and women. Data source:
Pilot study on Swiss pension funds as described in B¨ utler & Teppa (2002).
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Figure 3: Workers covered by an occupational pension plan as a fraction of the
active population since 1970. The numbers are somewhat overestimated due to
double–counting of insured individuals.


































Bondindex      
SPI            
Minimum rate 4%
Figure 4: Cumulated bond and stock returns since 1988 in comparison with a 4%
interest rate. SPI = Swiss Performance Index.
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Figure 5: Money’s worth ratio for a deferred annuity with a ﬁxed conversion fac-
tor (γ =7 .2%) as a function of age and applicable interest rates in a riskless
setting: rlaw and reﬀ denote the legal minimum return requirement and the pre-
vailing market interest rate, respectively. Contributions are assumed to grow at
2% annually.
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married women, NO widower pension 
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Figure 6: Money’s worth ratio as a function of gender and the age diﬀerence
between spouses (horizontal axis; negative numbers mean than that spouse is
younger). The ﬁgure is drawn for a retirement age of 62, a discount rate of
4% and a constant annuity.
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